Introduction
Citizens' resistance is an important mode of political participation. Numerous people from different walks of life, including workers, farmers, community dwellers, and homeworkers, have resorted to this mode of action to protect and pursue their interests. While many studies have focused on the dynamics of the resistance of disgruntled groups, little attention has been paid to what determines the responses of the targets of resistance -in this case, government or private actors (Sokphea, 2016; Cress and Snow, 2000; Soule, 2009; McAdam and Tarrow, 2000) . Some scholars suggest that the responses by the government or the State rely on the tactics or strategies of resistance. They argue that strong and innovative tactics tend to leverage influence on the government or private entities to concede (Gamson, 1990; Marx and McAdam, 1994; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) . Another group of scholars suggests that cost-benefit rationales shape the responses of the State, claiming that the aim of each response, whether concession, repression, or a combination of both, is to retain more benefits.
The most important benefit to retain is ensuring political legitimacy (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; Cai, 2010) . Although these propositions, to a certain degree, explain resistance cases in Western countries, they do not necessarily reflect the context of resistance in Southeast Asia.
In Cambodia, citizens' resistance occurs as a result of adverse changes in socio-economic conditions. Driven by improper policy implementation and regulatory enforcement, largescale land acquisition -either through buying or leasing large pieces of land by domestic or transnational companies, governments and individuals 1 (see Borras et al, 2011; Messerli et al, 2015) -caused chronic contention between and among the deprived communities, the government and private actors who were involved. The affected communities have 1 Globally, the size of land varies considerably, but it is usually greater than 2 hectares; see Messerli, Giger, Dwyer, Breu and Eckert (2014) . In Cambodia, the size is often bigger than 10,000 hectares and exceeding the Land Law's (2001) limitation.
orchestrated collective actions to forward their demands, including but not limited to return of the land, acceptable cash compensation, respect for human rights, and others. In response, the government, in collaboration with private companies, employed different mechanisms of response. Some communities faced partial concessions from the government and companies, while others were suppressed by the government and its instrumentalities. So far, the factors influencing the responses of the government and companies have not been well studied in the literature on Cambodia (see Schneider, 2011; Schoengerger, 2015; Swift, 2015; Messerli et al, 2015; Diepart, 2015) .
As a contribution to addressing this, this study draws on the popular and prolonged resistance of communities in southwestern Cambodia against large-scale land acquisition for the agro-sugar industry. Based on secondary and primary data, 2 the study postulates that, while the nature of resistance tactics and influencing strategies are important, cost-benefit rational choice appears to be more decisive in explaining the government response -a combination of partial concession and strong repression -towards the resistance by the communities. An important rationale underlying this response is the protection of patronclient networks, an entrenched relationship between the politico-commercial persons (middle patron) and the foreign companies (client), rather than retaining political legitimacy.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. It begins by reviewing the literature and conceptualizing a theoretical and analytical framework to explain and analyze the phenomenon of resistance as well as cost-benefit rational choice which shapes the government response. Following this section, the article empirically explores and explains community resistance, and factors stimulating the government and companies' responses to the communities. Last but not least, the article draws conclusions on how cost-benefit rational choice, in terms of protecting patron-client networks, determines both the government response and the consequences of the communities' resistance.
Resistance and Factors Rationalizing Government Response
In social movements, a resistance or a movement occurs as a result of rapid changes that affect the interests of a particular community, a group of people, or organization (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) . The goal of citizen resistance is to affect changes in particular things in the society, usually, but not always, conducted by a group of people with a particular interest and goal. Resistance is often known as a way by which the population or powerless can restrict and sever the source of power of their rulers or other oppressors, and mobilize their own potential power into effective power (Sharp, 2005) . Although resisters tend to avoid violence, it is a challenge for them to avoid conflict, especially violent measures undertaken by the targets . Though the target of a resistance remains debatable, Tilly (2004) , Soule (2009) and Sokphea (2016) claim that movements target not only government authorities or the state, but also the business sector.
In response, different governments choose different mechanisms to address resistance. Cai (2010) , in his work on China, conceptualizes four mechanisms of response: (i) concession: the resisters' demands are addressed; (ii) concession with discipline: the resisters' demands are met but some or all participants are punished; (iii) tolerance: the resisters' demands are ignored, but the target audience also tolerates the resistance; and (iv) repression:
the resisters' demands are ignored, and some or all participants are punished. Though these mechanisms of response have been clearly framed by such scholars, factors determining these responses remain contested. A number of factors, including influencing strategies, costbenefit rationale and patronage and clientelism, have been suggested to be determinants of the government's responses.
Scholars suggest that to influence a government or state, several resistance tactics and strategies might be used -for example, institutional versus non-institutional actions, legal versus illegal action, violence versus non-violence (Marx and McAdam, 1994; McAdam and Tarrow, 2000) , and non-disruptive versus disruptive tactics (Cress and Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1990) . These categories can be condensed as non-institutional and institutional tactics or nonviolent and violent tactics (Sokphea, 2016) . While sit-ins, road blockage, violent actions, and other harmful actions are deemed as non-institutional tactics, activities such as peaceful protests, boycotts, marches, petitions, lawsuits, and other means endorsed by a particular state or government are recognized as institutional tactics (Marx and McAdam, 1994) . Even though both types are prominent in resistance studies, many scholars assert that non-violent or institutional tactics tend to be more effective compared with violent ones (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011) . However, there are also those who suggest that violent actions tend to work in particular circumstances, such as those involving regime change or revolution (Gamson, 1990; Davenport, 2007) .
Influenced by rational choice theories, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) and Cai (2010) postulate that choosing the response mechanism relies on cost-benefit rationales. Goldstone and Tilly (2001) argue that a government response may swing back and forth between concession and repression or a combination of both in order to quell resistance. They hypothesize that if repression costs less than concession, a government may prefer repression, and vice versa. Further to Goldstone and Tilly (2001), Cai (2010) contends that there are two types of costs when a government concedes: economic and/or political costs, and signs of weakness; and two types of benefits: stopping resistance, and gaining legitimacy. Redressing citizens' concerns requires financial resources, thus it is government's economic burden.
Likewise, if addressing citizens' concerns requires policy reform or corrections in policy implementation, it is a political burden of the government. Another cost of making concessions is showing signs of weakness by acknowledging a government's malfeasance.
But the benefit from making concessions is that a government stops resistance and gains legitimacy (recognition of government) (Cai, 2010) . As a benefit, the repression deters resistance of citizens; as a cost, it increases illegitimacy perception, and risks of repressive measures. For example, if a government represses legitimate claims of citizens, the citizens will perceive government as illegitimate. Ineffective repressive measures might cause serious regime threats. If repressive measures orchestrated by a government fail to stop resistance completely, it provokes stronger resistance against that government, and thus, could lead to social instability (Cai, 2010) .
Whatever mechanism of response is employed, a government has to bear both costs and benefits. But the most important benefit to retain is maintaining political legitimacy of the government. While many scholars define legitimacy differently (see Lipset, 1981; Michelman, 2003; Michelson, 2005) , generally, it is interchangeable with "satisfaction with", "trust in", and "favorable attitudes towards" a government, according to Michelson (2005, p.2) . This study understands political legitimacy as a political system's worthiness to be recognized by citizen through the electoral system (Michelman, 2003) . In this instance, a government's response will entail either loss or retention of political legitimacy (Cai, 2010) .
While cost-benefit rationale appears to be a plausible explanation why a government opts for a particular response, patronage and clientelism-as derived from the seminal works of Scott (1972a Scott ( , 1972b in Southeast Asia-have not been properly investigated by Southeast Asian scholars as explanations for the responses of the government or target entities to resistance. Clientelism implies a dyadic and asymmetrical/unequal relationship between the patron and the client, while patronage is understood as the relationship between an individual person and a larger group (Scott, 1972a (Scott, , 1972b . But Hicken (2011) argues that, in patronage, the patron must hold a position in an office that has access to state resources. In clientelism, a patron may or not hold position in such an office and so may not be able to deliver public resources, but must rely on alternative means of exchange, including private and party resources (Hicken, 2011) . Despite these distinct characteristics, this study, as well as Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) , consider patronage and clientelism to be frequently synonymous and used interchangeably.
According to Scott (1972a Scott ( , 1972b , the patron-client relationship can be understood as a dyadic tie involving a largely instrumental friendship. In this friendship, an individual of higher socio-economic status (the patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection, or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (the client) who, for their part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance to the patron. This is clearly observed in rural and agrarian societies in Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar etc.), where reciprocal although not equal flows of services and goods from patron to client and vice versa are common (Scott, 1972a) . It is apparent that a client needs support from a patron either to avoid something or to gain something which otherwise would not be obtainable. Developing a clientelist network is a tool to gain protection and to achieve goals in a situation of societal uncertainty created by public institutions.
In his attempt to develop a typology of neo-patrimonial regimes in Southeast Asian and African countries, Bach (2011) asserts that state institutions are influenced by patronclient relationships. In countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, the relationships between state bureaucracy and private business are manifested in terms of cronyism, oligarchy, predatoriness and bureaucracy or rent (Bach, 2011) . These patterns of relations are often seen in the neo-patrimonial regime (Sindzingre, 2012) . The patrons award public or state resources to the clients to ensure loyalty or cultivate political support. In this system, the distinction between public and private spheres is formally and legally defined, but not always evident in practice (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994) .
Political change and the effects of popular resistance in Cambodia
Since the 1970s, Cambodia's political and economic systems have transformed over time:
from civil war to peace, from a planned economy to a free market economy, and from communism to democracy (Hughes, 2003 (Hughes, 2003; Pak et al, 2007; Sithirith, 2014; Un and So, 2009, 2011) . 
Popular resistance and policy change
Having been assisted by international and local NGOs, grassroots resistance has mounted since the early 2000s. Throughout the country, in both urban and rural areas, resistance has become a popular mode of leveraging influence to demand that government (provincial offices, ministries), private companies and other agencies remedy the adverse impacts. (Sokphea, 2016; Subedi, 2012 ). Even as the effectiveness of the moratorium on ELCs is subject to criticism (Sokphea, 2016) , some exploitative and inactive licenses have been revoked by the concerned ministries and environmental related regulations were re-enforced. By 2015, MoE, for example, announced the revocation of 23 ELCs in 12 provinces, constituting about 90,000 hectares (Titthara, 2015) . Meanwhile, MoE transferred some of the revoked ELCs to other companies with a reduced concession period of 50 or 70 years (Vida, 2015; Pheap, 2016) . Revocation of ELCs awarded by MAFF has also taken place but no exact figure has been published.
In addition, the Order aims to excise land like leopard skin from ELCs that overlaps with land of communities and individual farmers. To do so, a number of volunteer students were sent to all provinces to demarcate and reallocate land with official land tittles to the rightful claimant farmers or households. As of May 2013, 540,000 hectares, nearly 175,000
hectares of which were cut out of 88 ELC companies, were demarcated and re-allocated to 5 P02.
the individual farmers or households (MLMUPC, 2013 ). An NGO report published in July 2015 found that the review and cancellation of ELCs merely targeted dormant concessions but avoided concessions involved in land disputes (ADHOC, 2015) . Researchers hired by the NGO Forum also found similar issues (Grimsditch and Schoenberger, 2015) . To better understand the dynamics of the resistance, the responses and the factors stimulating the responses of the government, this study illustrates a case of lingering resistance against a large-scale land acquisition for an agro-sugar industry in Cambodia.
Research methods
Among other cases, community resistance against an agro-sugar industry project in Chikor
Leu commune, Sre Ambel district, Koh Kong province was chosen because, in addition to its lingering resistance, it is known by NGOs as a model of resistance by disgruntled communities in Cambodia. Lessons from this case were drawn by a number of NGOs and advocates for application with other cases in the country. In addition to a review of literature, in-depth interviews with twenty key informants who represent all stakeholders involved in the dispute (company, government, NGOs and community) were held. Two interactive focus group discussions were conducted to collect empirical evidence from the case. The informants included three community activists, four NGO staff, nine local and senior government officials (including ELC secretariat), two company staff, and two academic and independent researchers (see appendix). Ten villagers from diverse backgrounds were invited to participate in each interactive focus group discussion. The key informants from NGOs and government were selected based on snowball sampling. Two senior staff of the two companies were directly approached for interviews. Meanwhile, three community representatives from the three villages which were affected by the land acquisition, were interviewed. All interviews were audio-recorded and names of respondents were anonymized to comply with research ethics requirements. The fieldwork began in August 2013 and was completed in January 2014. To analyze the empirical evidence, the study employed a qualitative process-tracing method that focuses on explaining the dynamics and consequences of resistance of the communities. Process tracing is a method of analyzing causal factors that explain outcomes of an interactive event or phenomenon (Beach and Pedersen, 2013 Unfortunately, however, in May 2006, the sugar companies' bulldozers accompanied by the armed forces, without prior consultation nor proper social and environment impact assessments, 13 cleared villagers' plantations, paddy fields and forests. Since then, the affected communities resisted against these adverse changes. 14 The aim was to influence the government, as well as the sugar companies, to address their demands as explained below.
9 Focus Group Discussion (FGD)1, FGD2 and P02 (please refer to the appendix). 10 This figure is drawn from the commune database and discussions with commune councils. 11 According to Land Law 2001, those who occupied the land 5 years prior to the effect of the 2001 law are legally entitled to own the land. These communities are thus legal owners of the land. On this ground, the communities are the rightful claimant. 12 FDG1 and FGD2. 13 P20. No impact studies were fully conducted before the operation of plantations. 14 FDG01 and FDG02, P04, P10 and P12.
• To return their land after the sugar company endorsed by the government confiscated about 5,000 hectares of land that previously belonged to about 600 households. 15 The communities believed that land is everything; loss of land is loss of occupation and income;
• To be compensated either in cash or land swap. If their land will not be returned, the government has to provide a replacement plot of land for them, or otherwise offer appropriate cash compensation, and
• To remedy adverse impacts on their livelihoods.
To influence the government to address their demands, the communities employed several tactics, such as peaceful protest, petition, filling complaints with the provincial court, and networking with NGOs. Since 2006 and almost every year till the present, they organized peaceful protests and road blockages, which attracted a number of local and international media agencies. In September 2006, the protest of the communities was confronted with strong repression by armed security guards who consisted of military personnel and policemen. They shot at the crowd, injuring one woman, and assaulted four others. 16 Besides that, in the same year, policemen also attempted to arrest some community representatives, but they escaped and hid in the forest. Even though these empowered the representatives to be outspoken, the government officials claimed that these representatives were opposition party activists that instigated the communities to mobilize against (and to overthrow) the legitimate government.
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In 2009, the sugar companies increased their cash compensation to around US$2000 per household. About 39 households accepted the offer. Yet, this amount of cash remained insufficient to acquire another plot of land. 22 The remaining families, along with assistance from NGOs, resorted to various influencing strategies to elevate their influence.
Shifting influencing strategies and responses
In 2010, the local NGOs realized that the raw sugar was being exported from Cambodia to its parent company in Thailand, namely Khon Kaen Sugar Industry (KSL), for final refining. 01BB to reallocate land overlapping with ELCs to the rightful claimant villagers.
Unfortunately, the order was not enforced in Chikor Leu commune. The communities claim that, because of the power of the senator, the provincial governor of Koh Kong did not enforce the Order according to the PM and the affected communities' demands.
In 2012, the communities, through the local NGOs, filed a complaint on the adverse impacts of the EU's EBA in Cambodia to the EU Delegation in Cambodia and in Brussels. In January 2014, the EU Parliament passed a resolution calling on its executive body to act on EU's EBA scheme that induced high risk of human rights violations in Cambodia. Later, an EU Member of Parliament officially visited Cambodia and uncovered the serious impacts of the agro-sugar industries. In response, the Minister of Commerce led a meeting and set up a working group to solve the sugar issue (Reaksmey and Petter, 2014) . So far, there has been no significant progress made by EU's efforts and those of the working group.
As of late 2012, the sugar companies increased the cash compensation to about US$3120 per household. Although it remains low, the aim was to lobby the communities to accept cash and to cease their protests and complaints. 28 In particular, 21 households later opted for the offer. As of late 2013, the cash compensation was again increased to more than US$3120 per family, but none of the families accepted the offer because the communities were confident with the UK court and EU's intervention.
28 P04, P11 and P12.
Consequence of resistance
Evidence in the preceding sections suggests that, to achieve their demands, the communities employed tactical escalation from domestic influencing strategies -peaceful protests, petitions and filing complaints -to international strategies. The communities initially employed domestic influencing strategies to directly target the government institutions, such as the commune, district, provincial offices, MoI, national assembly and MAFF in the hopes of them regulating the sugar companies to address their demands. Since these strategies did not achieve fruitful outcomes besides inadequate cash compensation and repressive responses, the communities resorted to NGOs and staged international influencing strategies to directly influence the sugar companies and stakeholders at each stage of the sugar supply chain, and to indirectly influence the government. Although their international influencing strategies were strong, the communities did not receive any fruitful responses except the cash compensation. They suffered much delay and were accused of being part of the opposition party. With these responses, the resistance of the affected communities appears to have failed to achieve most of their demands: restitution of their land, acceptable cash compensation and other remedies for the adverse impacts to their livelihoods. They failed because their resistance encountered strong repression and partial concession by the government and sugar companies.
Rationales of government responses: strong repression and partial concession
This section argues that the government's combination of strong repression and partial concession is based on a cost-benefit rationale as suggested by Cai (2010) , rather than influencing strategies and tactics. However, the most important rationale is not about maintaining or gaining political legitimacy, but protecting patron-client networks between the politico-commercial person and the foreign investors.
Failure of influencing strategies and tactics
The communities initially believed that domestic influencing strategies would be effective tools to exert influence on the government so that they may pressure the sugar companies to address their demands. Although these strategies appear to be necessary as part of the dynamics of the resistance, they did not influence the government, especially the provincial chains, consisting of complaints to buyers in the UK, the sugar companies in Thailand and the EU's EBA program. While these strategies leveraged certain influence, they did not produce any satisfactory results. The amount of cash compensation was increased in 2013, but it was still low. Meanwhile, other demands (livelihood, land) of the communities were not addressed. These influencing strategies (organizational networking, external support, domestic protests, petitions, filing complaints) failed to leverage significant pressure and failed to decisively explain why the government, in collaboration with the sugar companies, opted for a combination of strong repression and partial concession.
Cost-benefit rationales: to protect patron-client networks
Taking a rational choice perspective into account, the aforementioned response mechanism was chosen because the government perceived that it would incur more benefits than costs.
While Cai (2010) suggests that an important benefit to retain was maintaining political legitimacy of the government, the evidence in this case suggests that the ultimate aim of this response was to protect the economic interests of the patron-client network embedded in this agro-industry.
In this instance, a combination of strong repression and partial concession was chosen to avoid economic and political costs but it provoked lingering resistance by the communities and caused a perception of illegitimacy. The government refused to offer full concessions to eschew malfeasance. Evidence showed that the government, especially MAFF, defended itself by claiming that all adverse impacts were remedied. Not only was the Order No. 01BB issued to correct the mistakes of the government, it aimed to resolve the increasing grassroots community resistance. However, evidence from this case and other studies convince that the Order was not fairly enforced throughout the country (Grimsditch and Schoenberger, 2015; Diepart, 2015) . In Chikor Leu commune, the volunteer students were asked by the provincial governor not to excise the overlapping land from the company's ELCs because he claimed that the students could exacerbate the dispute. 31 In fact, the sugar companies were not punished because of the power of the senator. 32 If the sugar companies were to be punished, it would prove that the senator accepted the allegations.
Moreover, if full concession was chosen, the government, as well as the senator, would lose a large amount of money, and lose a big portion of ELCs. To defend the senator's companies, the government claimed that the demand for 5,000 hectares from the 20,000 hectares of ELCs was excessive. 33 It would cost a lot to the government as well as the senator if the government were to fully concede. In particular, the sugar companies claimed that they would need to pay again for the land that they already paid for.
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In 2013, the EU reported that these sugar industries were exporting about US$38 million worth of sugar to the EU market annually. 35 The volume of sugar exports was anticipated to increase in the following years. This amount of rent is significant for those clients (or middle patrons) of the regime who financially support the central patron (or ruling party) to influence election results (Hughes, 2003; Un and So, 2009, 2011 to extract more rent from the sugarcane investment. As the volume of rent is significant, all concerned institutions, the provincial office in particular, have to protect this political figure.
To do so, the government opted for strong repressive measures. The government, like the companies, bore little economic and political costs. But this mode of response would either provoke or deter future resistance.
During the early stage of resistance, the communities faced strong repression; the government violently dispersed their peaceful protests. 36 Later, their more outspoken members were repressed by the concerned institutions of the government. However, these could not deter all of the communities from resisting. They instead provoked the remaining households to pursue resistance in the following years. 37 To reiterate, the strength of resistance has escalated since 2007, and shifted from domestic influencing strategies (in 2010) to international influencing strategies, although these have thus far leveraged no influence on the government and sugar companies to concede. Hence these more repressive than concessional responses did not deter the resistance, bit they affected the legitimacy of the government in the disputed areas.
Repressing rightful claims of resistance damages regime legitimacy. However, evidence shows that, although its legitimacy declined, the ruling government managed to win the election in Chikor Leu commune. An activist comments:
Why a majority of people in our villages who used to support Cambodian People's Party 
Benefits: protecting patron-client network, deterring resistance or retaining legitimacy
Given the above reasons, the government did not actually retain legitimacy. It is not 40 National Election Committee (NEC)'s official election results of commune councils (2007, 2012) , and national elections (2008, 2013 Pye, 2015) .
Conclusion
This paper has fleshed out the dynamics of interactions among the Government, companies and affected communities in pursuit of their respective interests. The affected communities employed various domestic influencing strategies, escalating from institutional means, including peaceful protest, petitions, lawsuit and networking, to international influencing strategies, such as filing complains to involved stakeholders at each stage of the sugar supply chain. These were initially employed to influence the Government in the hopes it would regulate the sugar companies, and later were orchestrated to directly influence the companies to address their demands.
The Government's responses tended to evolve over time and swing back and forth between strong repression and partial concession; they repressed and later offered partial concessions and vice versa. Initially, the Government opted for strong repression: (i) violently dispersing peaceful protests, (ii) intimidating and threatening the communities and outspoken representatives (iii) procrastinating in the response to the communities, and (iv) accusing the communities of being involved in the opposition party's movement. Later, to partially concede, the government-in collaboration with the companies-shifted to offer cheap cash compensation. Although the cash compensation was seen as the residual impacts of the escalation of the communities' influencing strategies, because of livelihood issues and other threatening behaviour, a number of communities' members forced themselves to accept low cash compensation. While these responses shifted back and forth between concession and repression, the shift did not address all of the demands of the communities.
Overall, the resistance of the communities failed to achieve all their demands because the Government, in collaboration with the companies, apparently opted for a combination of strong repression and partial concession. The reason underlying why the Government opted for this mechanism of response is not decisively explained by influencing strategies or tactics as suggested by a number of scholars (see for example Gamson, 1990; McAdam, 1983) .
Influencing strategies (organizational networking, external support, supply chain approach) in this resistance were strong, but failed to influence the Government, as well as the companies, to fully concede. Opting for this mechanism of response was rather a result of thoughtful cost-benefit rational choice of the government vis-à-vis the companies' owner. However, the cost-benefit rationales behind the response was not about gaining political legitimacy of the government as suggested by Cai (2010) and Goldstone and Tilly (2001) , but protecting the economic benefits of the patron-client network which formed between the foreign companies and a local powerful politico-commercial person. This is claimed on the grounds that it is implausible that repression of the communities' rightful resistance incurred more legitimacy.
Although the ruling party's government managed to win the elections in the disputed areas, the elections were not organized in a fair and transparent manner and it did not reflect the perception of legitimacy by the communities.
This study concludes and argues that cost-benefit rational choice of Cai (2010) and Goldstone and Tilly (2001) shapes the government's responses, and ultimately determines the outcome of Cambodian popular resistance. However, an important rationale, rather than gaining legitimacy, is protecting the patron-client network in extracting rent. Protecting patron-client networks has long been seen in the context of the agrarian society in Southeast Asia as suggested by Scott (1972a Scott ( , 1972b . This has implications for other cases in Cambodia where a combination of strong repression and partial concession is often chosen to respond to the communities' resistance in Kampong Speu and Kampong Chhnang provinces. For instance, the lingering case of Lar Peang community resistance against a company owned by the wife of a powerful (mine and energy) minister in Kampong Chhnang province has not been solved (see Mengleng, 2009 ). This community encountered more repressive measures because the involved government institutions tended to protect the economic interests of the political figure. In Kampong Speu, movements of the affected communities against the sugarcane investment received no significant results because strong repression was orchestrated to protect the powerful owner. To discourage rampant resistance in the country, the ruling government should take these issues into consideration and re-enforce relevant regulations in a more transparent and fair way. Deeper land reform is needed to discourage lingering resistance which might harm the regime and even cause political instability in the future. 
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